Loyalist Riots, Poverty, and Irish Labour in N. Ireland

Below is an article I wrote in early Oct. 2005. It's about how around that time a problem seemed to be peaking (I don't think it was all that new, but seemed to have peaked or at least gotten a lot more attention in the media), a problem with the socio-economic problems facing the unionist/loyalist working-class and how (and this was definitely not new) their political representatives overwhelmingly either didn't care or were inclined to offer solutions based on capitalism and/or sectarianism.

A significant chunk of it was based on an email interview with Mark Langhammer, the current head of the N. Ireland part of the Irish Labour Party (at the time it was called the N. Ireland Labour Forum, basically a transition (I imagine) to smooth over the fact that organizing there would bring them into conflict with their sister organization the Social Democratic and Labour Party). Unfortunately, I ended up wasting his time. The second article I was going to write (about the NILF) didn't get written for various reasons, and although it's complicated and kind of involves me not doing something I told Mark I would do, the first article didn't get published. But I'm publishing it now. At the very least it'll be a neat picture of how things were recently, and it likely has not changed (unfortunately, I'm pretty sure this is the kind of thing I could only know if I had been reading something like 125-150 articles a week the last 4 years, and it was closer to 55, and I'd probably have to dig to have any chance of finding the info now). Also, it might generate some support for the Irish Labour Party. Anyway, here it is.

UPDATE 4/23/11 When I say that 44% of the population is Catholic, that is the % that are from a Catholic background, which would include Atheists who live in Catholic areas and probably identify to some degree as nationalists and probably view the police as sectarian towards them (the police don't know these people are Atheists and might not care).

UPDATE 2/23/16 Before or after you read this you might want to read a relevant post on my blog here.

Loyalist Riots, Poverty, and Irish Labour in N. Ireland
By Tom Shelley

In early September Northern Ireland (NI) experienced 3 days and nights of intense rioting by elements of the Protestant, pro-British "unionist" population. Although not unprecedented, it was of the intensity almost always associated with the Catholic Irish "nationalists" and republicans when tension with the security forces reaches breaking point. The spark that ignited the unionist rioting on Saturday Sept. 9th was the slight re-routing of a unionist Orange Order (OO) parade away from a nationalist area- the OO is very hostile to nationalists and refuses to even negoatiate with them about this. But all commentary about the violence has said that it was much more about a growing sense of alienation from, and anger towards, the Peace Process among working-class unionists. Mark Devenport of the BBC NI has said, "... they believe the political process is slanted towards republicans, as the British and Irish governments push ahead with their quid pro quo for the IRA's announcement that it will destroy its guns and end its armed campaign. Beyond the high politics, many loyalist areas are clearly suffering an economic and social malaise, with Protestants in inner city working class enclaves feeling increasingly alienated from wider society" (BBC News Online, 9/11/05). In late Aug. Tom McGurk, a columnist for the Sunday Business Post, wrote that "these Protestant working class communities are currently in the grip of a terrible malaise, with high economic and educational failure rates and more and more traditional employment areas - such as security, for example - closing down on them. Hidden behind the dispute about the peace process is the failure of the wider unionist leadership to organise or even motivate these communities in a new direction. Behind the predictable unionist political shibboleth-speak is a political and communal failure that has left these communities without hope or expectation" (SBP 8/21/05).

After a recent unionist protest where mainstream politicians worked with unionist paramilitary leaders, one of the politicians, from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), defended this collaboration by saying "this is about the victims, we are the victims” (SBP 9/04/05).

It is this sense of alienation and social/economic malaise which needs to be seriously examined and where something can be done to redress their grievances without re-inforcing the historic and current inequality between nationalists and unionists, urgent action needs to be taken. But are the specific grievances of these communities legitimate? Some might be inclined to think that the "tables have been turned," that unionists are now the under-dogs, that the British government has made so many concessions to nationalists and republicans that they are now in a dominant position. The following issues have generated discontent among unionist, and especially working-class unionist communities:

EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION
According to official figures, from March 2002 to February 2003 unemployment among Protestants was about 4%. According to a recent official report, 25% of Protestant households are in poverty. In general, NI has always had much lower wages than most other western industrialized nations- that has not changed. For example, in 2004, on average, a junior computer programmer in Belfast earned about Euro26,005 a year, compared with Euro44,014 in Dublin or Euro47,065 in London. In education, when taking an exam (the hated, class-biased Eleven-Plus) that determines which level of secondary education they go to, working-class unionist students often do worse than all other groups- in the Shankill area (a large section of Belfast representative of working-class unionist areas), only 2% passed in 2001. A report by the Shankill Partnership found that in the Shankill 62.04% of adults aged between 16 and 74 had no post-secondary qualifications, compared with the Belfast average of 39.60% and a NI average of 41.64%.

On the other hand, plenty of statistics indicate that, where sectarian inequality exists, it is Catholics who are disadvantaged. According to official figures, From March 2002 to February 2003 Catholics were twice as likely to be unemployed as Protestants (in 1988 the rate was two and a half times, in 1971 it was twice). According to a recent official report, 39% of Catholic households are in poverty. Of those Catholics who in 2001 were economically active, 9% were managers and senior officials, while 10% is the figure for Protestants. Among large employers and higher managerial positions, 35% are Catholic and 62% are Protestant, but in the general population Catholics are 44%, Protestants 53%. Among the long-term unemployed, Catholics are 57%, Protestants 40%. These figures indicate significant improvement, but also significant room for more improvement. They certainly don't indicate that Protestants are now the victims as some unionist politicians have recently been claiming. And, to whatever degree Protestants are losing jobs to Catholics, that is, unfortunately, a somewhat unavoidable result of anti-discrimination measures in a capitalist society without full employment. To their credit, most anti-discrimination campaigners are sensitive to this and have called for full employment measures and anything else that will end discrimination without hurting Protestants.

While working-class unionists are experiencing poor educational rates, in 2001, of those adults with no educational qualifications, 43% were Catholic, 56% were Protestants, almost exactly what they should be in a non-sectarian society. The figures were almost the same for those with Bachelors (and similar) degrees. It should also be pointed out that the Eleven Plus and the two-tiered, class-based education system it represented was officially ended by Sinn Fein's (SF) Martin McGuiness while he was NI Minister for Education (this was just before the NI Assemby was suspended in Oct. of 2002 and a replacement system has not yet been decided on). The two main unionist parties supported retaining the Eleven-Plus. The idea that working-class unionists are harmed by the advancing republican agenda is largely nonsense; in fact, they are often helped by it.

PROTESTANT PARLIAMENT FOR A PROTESTANT PEOPLE??
A lot of loyalists are unhappy that NI is no longer a Protestant supremacist statelet. NI was founded on sectarianism and inequality for the Catholic minority. Until the 1970s senior unionist politicians frequently made public comments affirming this. In 1934 James Craig (Prime Minister from 1921-1940) said "all I boast is that we have a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State." The Orange Order, an exclusively Protestant group, was used as a network to facilitate widespread discrimination. Gerrymandering and property qualifications kept Catholics out of power even where they were a large majority. In local elections, those without a home (either public-sector or private) didn't have a vote, but some (mostly Protestant) company directors got extra votes based on the worth of the companies. In regional elections (for the NI Parliament) there was no property qualification, but the compney vote existed, and (mostly Protestant) University graduates voted in both their geographic constituency and a virtual one that elected four MPs (out of 52). In order to maintain unionist power at local level, in most areas Catholics were denied any new housing, which resulted in various forms of homelessness such as multiple large families living in the same small house. Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) governments (the only kind during the entire 1921-1972 life-time of the devolved parliament) were dominated by the business class, but generally had the complete support of working-class Protestants through the bigotry of the Orange Order, discrimination, loyalty to the British Monarchy and Empire, and hyping the threat from republicans and the South (the Republic).

Starting in the 1960s with a liberal Prime Minister and the Civil Rights Movement, and accelerating with the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), the Protestant supremacist nature of the NI state has been severely eroded. The British did, in the early 1970s, completely reform the electoral set-up. In 1972 they ended the regional parliament and introduced direct-rule. After that there remained many ways in which unionists wielded undue influence and in many ways the British authorities had a double standard against nationalists, but raw anti-Catholic bigotry was rarely evident with the British government and they weren't quite as deferential to the demands of extreme unionists as the regional government had been. The GFA has fully legitimized the identity and equality of Catholics and nationalists. It has required that the Executive of the Assembly includes both nationalists and unionists, whereas from 1921-72 the regional government completely excluded nationalists.

These democratic reforms are entirely appropriate and in fact more is needed. Does this mean that unionists are, will, and should continue to "lose?" In terms of Westminster MPs, until the recent 2005 election, unonists were over-represented; in 2005 the percentage of MPs who are unionist mirrors that of unionists in the general population. That was also true in the 1998 and 2003 Assembly elections. And certainly there has been no gerrymandering or voter disenfranchisement against anyone. In fact, because of some IRA activity, real or alleged, SF MPs (who don't take their seats), have been denied the allowances that they're entitled to as MPs.

DEMILITARIZATION
A central demand of SF and the SDLP in recent years has been that the presence of the security forces and especially the British Army (BA) should be dramatically scaled down. NI was until recently an incredibly militarized society, even years after the IRA cease-fire and some decommissioning. Now that the British government is pushing ahead with demilitarization and cutting troop numbers in NI, this will inevitably affect the unionist economy- since the BA has done a lot of business with unionist firms, those firms will see a shortfall and have to lay people off. Also, London will, in 2007, disband most of the NI-recruited BA unit, the Royal Irish Regiment, which will result in even more Protestant unemployment and has infuriated unionists.

Demilitarization is absolutely appropriate and neccessary if the Peace Process is to move forward. The BA has consistently and one-sidedly brutalized the nationalist community since 1969 and their presence intimitadory to nationalists. The RIR units based in NI are notorious for their sectarianism and connections to unionist paramilitaries.

However, economically there will likely be a very negative impact on unionists. In general, some voices have been calling recently for greater funding in all disadvantaged areas, Catholic or Protestant, and it would make sense for the British to use money saved from demilitarization for this purpose, as a peace dividend.

DRUGS, RACKETEERING AND FEUDING
It's widely accepted that drugs dealing in NI is dominated by unionist paramilitaries, and that many unionist working-class areas are steeped in drugs, paramilitary racketeering, and paramiltary thugery. This has certainly had a negative effect on, for example, young people and the development of community infrastructure in such areas. And yet some of those who complain about the problems plauging such areas are also associated with unionist paramilitaries. In general, the police do little to stop unionist paramilitaries, despite the liklihood that they have enough intelligence and evidence to arrest and convict most of them (this is based on the well-documented history of collusion between the two, and the sometimes shared background of family and neighborhoods). On a related matter, in recent years there have been frequent feuds between the different unionist paramilitaries, including one that claimed four lives this Summer. In a very blatant display of their double standards, in July the police stood by while masked men, members of one paramilitary, took over a unionist neighborhood to expel members of another unionist paramilitary.

Mark Langhammer, a long-time Independent Labour district councilor in working-class unionist area, describes the effect of these paramilitary activities on working-class unionist areas as "corrosive" and says that the paramilitaries work to run them like "criminal fiefdoms. ... Paramilitarism does form part of the community, but a parasitical rather than positive part."

Despite these activities and continuing sectarian murders (since the IRA's cease-fire began in July 1997, unionist paramilitaries have committed 32 murders motivated purely by bigotry), the police have done very little to crack down on them. Even after the rioting in Sept., which engulfed the Belfast area for 72 hrs. and included many shots fired at the police, only about 50 people were arrested. The police have the ability to arrest and convict a huge chunk of the unionist paramilitaries, something which would go a long way to improving conditions in working-class unionist communities.

COMMUNITY
In nationalist working-class areas, there is a rich political culture based on center-left politics and strong networks of community groups. SF, although multi-tendencied and focused on the national question, is generally socialist. Their more moderate rival, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), although slightly mis-named and to the right of SF, is nonetheless somewhat social-democratic. Nationalist working-class areas are home to numerous anti-poverty, women's, youth, residents', and cultural groups that help people with advice and assistance on a wide range of issues. Even though there is great poverty, it generally doens't result in despair and destructive behavior.

In working-class unionist areas, such community and political culture rarely exists. Sammy Douglas, the director of the East Belfast Partnership has explained that "the tradition in Protestant areas has tended to be of self-reliance, individualism and jobs in heavy industry - jobs that are now gone" (BBC News Online 9/13/05). He fails to mention the discrimination and lack of conflict with the State. Langhammer says that community leadrship a generation ago "was provided by working class people steeped in the trade unionism of manufacturing," but that this is no longer the case. In general, the relatively privileged position that working-class unionists had until recently meant that they didn't need to develop such community groups or any kind of socialist agenda. Under the regional government between 1921 and 1972, and to some degree for a couple decades since then, jobs, housing, political power and education were largely handed to them, relative to nationalists. They weren't in conflict with the State, they were allied with it.

This disparity in community organization (which, according to Langhammer and also the NI Department of Regional Development might be exxagerated), is actually one of the recent complaints by unionists. Douglas complains that nationalist communities “are streets ahead of us in terms of education, community development, culture, everything" (SBP 9/18/05). Although Douglas is very critical of the early Sept. riots, most unionist spokespeople don't explain how the recent rioting, or support for unionist paramilitaries and center-right parties, would redress this imbalance by developing unionist working-class communities.

Another part of this problem is the decline of two small working-class unionist parties. The Ulster Democratic Party, while connected to the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and not defined by progressive politics, did have some progressive tendencies. But it didn't win any seats in the 1998 Assembly elections, and in 2001, when the UDA became solidly anti-GFA it ordered the pro-GFA UDP to dissolve itself, which it did. The Progressive Unionist Party, while connected to the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force, is progressive, socialist, feminist, relatively anti-sectarian, and very willing to dialogue with nationalists and republicans. Their growth in the late 1990s was welcomed by nationalists and republicans, but in recent elections they have declined to getting only two local government seats in 2005, from a 1997 high of 7. The PUP has been completely shoved aside by the UDA and the DUP (who now has 9 out of 18 MPs). The DUP, although using some populist appeals to unionist workers, is generally conservative, almost fascist, fanatical about maintaining partition, and sees everything in terms of what Protestants get compared to what Catholics get.

To a large degree the unionist working-class can't blame anyone but themselves for this decline of political organizations that would contribute to developing their communities- they certainly can't blame republicans and nationalists, who have given some of their transfers in proportional representation elections to the PUP and some UDP candidates. Also, working-class unionists sometimes seek assistance from nationalist community groups and recieve it.

UNITED IRELAND
Another issue aggravating unionists is the perception that they are sliding into a United Ireland, that London is close to "abandoning" them. This perception is somewhat irrational, as republicans and nationalists have compromised a lot in the Peace Process- SF has officially accepted that the status of NI will not change until a majority of it's voters say so, and they have been helping administer what is largely British rule in part of Ireland through participating in the Assembly's Executive. On the other hand, there has been some movement towards a United Ireland. Such moves are in line with Ireland's right to national self-determination and, based on hundreds of years of Anglo-Irish history, are neccessary to protect the rights of nationalists. When Ireland was partitioned in the early 1920s, the Ulster Unionist Party was organized in all nine counties of the province of Ulster. But they, and London, realized that, since they were losing control of most of Ireland, the nine county area had too large a Catholic/nationalist minority. They cherry-picked the six counties that make up NI- four of which had Protestant/unionist majorities, and two which didn't but had some of the best farmland in the area. They also included the large nationalist majority city of Derry, which could have been easily excluded- but it had historical value for unionists, as well as a lot of industry with a cheap, disempowered Catholic workforce. NI was gerrymandered so that the British could retain control over as large a part of Ireland as they could, within which there would be a semi-permanent unionist majority. As a minority in NI, nationalists experienced a nightmare comparable to that of Blacks in the American South under segregation. While London's involvement since 1972 remedied some grievances of the nationalist community, the BA, the police, and their surrogates in the unionist paramilitaries frequently brutalized that community. It is clear that nationalists can't realistically expect more than occassional justice and equality under British rule.

Although unionists, out of bigotry or fear of being abused, are very opposed to a United Ireland, history and Irish politics indicate they have little to worry about. Since partition, in the South (the Republic) there have been almost no instances of anti-Protestant discrimination and violence, and at one point Protestants were over-represented in Parliament. Although problems remain with the Catholic Church-inspired policies on abortion, the fact is that most unionists are pro-life, and in general the power of the Church in the Republic has been greatly reduced in recent decades. Ireland's main paper, based in Dublin, is actually somewhat pro-unionist. All political parties in the South have expressed sensitivity to the concerns of unionists.

Resolving this problem will involve unionists becoming more comfortable with the Irish part of their identity, and for working-class unionists to think of themselves more as workers and make common cause with their nationalist brothers and sisters. A United Ireland will almost certainly not involve more than tiny, isolated incidents of anti-Protestant abuse and a successful resolution of the conflict will almost certainly strengthen labor and progressive movements which will benefit working-class Protestants.

POLICING
There have been some reforms to the police in NI. The Royal Ulster Constabluary had always been armed and enforced the inequality of nationalists through intimidation and ocassional bouts of internment, violence, and/or collusion with extreme unionists. Although some reforms have been made as part of the GFA and it has been renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland, this hasn't stopped them from occassionally continuing their activities against nationalists, but it has created some hostility between them and working-class unionists.

Even after four years of an affirmative action, 50/50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment plan, in January of 2005 only about 18% of the PSNI were Catholic, while about 44% of the population is Catholic. The membership of the PSNI includes most of the old RUC. So, in fact reform of the police needs to go even further. Those who have colluded with unionist paramilitaries, are members of the anti-Catholic Orange Order, or are human rights violators, should be purged.

The reforms already made, and any additional ones that will be made, will be beneficial to working-class unionists. In recent decades there has been occassional and small scale police brutality aimed at unionists, and the repressive machinery of the police could be used against leftists and labor activists, including those among the unionist community.

UNIONIST BACKLASH?
If, after such modest change, unionists react with the intense rioting of early September, what can be expected when further progress on equality and uniting Ireland is made? Depending on how that progress is achieved, probably much worse violence. Although the IRA completely disarmed in late Sept. the unionist paramilitaries haven't disarmed and have said they won't- in recent years the UDA cease-fire has been very shaky, and in September London announced it no longer recognized the UVF cease-fire.

What can be done to avoid or at least minimize a violent unionist backlash? In general, everything that can facilitate dialogue between nationalists and unionists should be done. Many groups are already doing so, such as the Pat Finucane Centre. It's also neccessary to develop working-class unionist communities. Something that would help with both of these would be the development of labor and socialist organizations in NI, especially in those communities.

But NI, especially recently, has been dominated by parties that largely focus on the National Question- partition. In Westminster elections, during the entire history of NI, no more than 5 times have candidates been elected on a platform that didn't focus on partition.

The UUP, which until the early 1970s had a monopoly on unionist politics and won most elections, was, until 1972, also the NI branch of the Conservative Party. The nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party has been since it's formation in 1970 a member of the Socialist International and in the 1970s was somewhat socialist, but since then has attracted almost no Protestant support, possibly because it's close to the Catholic Church. SF has often throughout it's history, especially in the 1980s and in recent years, been dominated by socialist tendencies. But both SF and the SDLP have been based mostly on the National Question, and the former is connected to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The DUP, formed in the 1970s, sometimes exhibits economic populism, but not of a sort that could be described as socialist, and it's extreme committment to maintaining Protestant supremacy and the link with Britain is primary; it attracts zero Catholics.

The Alliance Party, formed in the 1970s, has based itself largely on straddling the unionist and nationalist positions and attracting Catholics and Protestants, but is very middle-class (there is less tension and violence among middle-class people) and centrist. They get about 5% of the vote. The Women's Coalition (WC) is similar to the Alliance (though more prorgressive and all female) but after highs of about 1% in the late 90s, they got .1% in the 2005 Local elections. In those elections the Green Party broke out, getting 1% and 3 councilours, but on averge their voters were fairly middle-class. All other parties in this vein do even worse than the WC.

But there is a recent development that could mark the beginning of something with great potential to attract working-class unionists to an anti-sectarian, progressive, labor/socialist agenda which could develop their communities and prepare them for a United Ireland. The Irish Labour Party (ILP), in late 2004, launched the NI Labour Forum as an official section of the Party. At this point it is not contesting elections and welcomes people who are members of either no party or of a party that is in the Socialist International, including the British Labour Party (which doesn't have any organization in NI) and the SDLP.

The ILP, although supportive of a United Ireland and the human rights concerns of nationalists, is in no way associated with the IRA, SF, the Catholic Church, or the communal divisions in NI. As such it will probably be able to attract a lot of support from working-class and progressive unionists who are moderate on partition. Unlike the Green Party or WC the NILF would, as a part of the ILP, have a strong connection to the trade-unions in NI, which are affiliated to the ILP.

The most prominent figure associated with the NILF is Langhammer, who has run for office as a Labour candidate for decades. In 3 elections between 1993 and 2001 he was elected, with a surplus of votes (in the Proportional Representation/Single Transferable Vote system used in most Irish elections), to the Newtownabbey District Council. The urban, multiple-member constituency he represented is overwhelmingly Protestant and three of it's six wards are, acording to the 2001 census, incredibly poverty stricken- the remaining three appear roughly lower middle-class. It is just outside the conflict-ridden interface neighborhoods of north Belfast. After an impressive vote in 2001, he decided against running this year, partly to focus on the NILF and partly because local government will be dramatically re-arranged in the next few years, so this term will be more of a "lame duck" period where not much work will be done.

On the potential for the NILF to lead the unionist working-class away from scetarianism, paramilitaries, and center-right parties, he says, "in the short term, very little. In the longer term, I believe that ONLY the gravitational pull of state power - the battles of 'Who Governs and in Whose interest?' will be capable of drawing people away from sectarian and communal positions."

The fact that the NILF will have a strong connection to the trade-unions should also be very helpful. Although they have generally been held back by sectarian divisions, in 2003 39% of the labor force in NI was unionized. In his 1998 book "McCann: War and Peace in Northern Ireland," NI socialist and trade-unionist Eamonn McCann writes, "the trade union movement is better placed than any other to purge the politics of this island of sectarianism. No other institution brings Catholic and Protestant workers together on a regular basis in pursuit of a common purpose which is antipathetic to sectarianism." McCann makes it clear that he doesn't think this potential has been tapped more than occassionally, and Langhammer agrees with his analysis.

But when combined with a socialist/social-democratic political agenda developed by an all-Ireland party (as the ILP is becoming), this potential might be realized in such a way that, in ten years or so, will help transform working-class unionist communities.