Strategically Comprehensive

In a recent poem I created this rhyming couplet about Sinn Fein and the IRA (if you're not familiar with my poems, I should explain that I almost always write with someone else's voice, not my own)- “We started with defending our areas, now we’re on the offensive/The republican struggle is strategically comprehensive.” (The first line isn’t relevant to this but I think it’s a good rhyme) (it's a reference to the diversity of their tactics and strategy, for more on that keep reading). Not long after that I discussed with a friend in Dublin (who is also a left-wing supporter of Sinn Fein) the calls by some for SF MPs in the British Parliament (now, *7* of them!) to take their seats (the Democratic Unionist Party took 10 and there is one independent unionist). The argument that I read here and there in favor of SF doing it is that, in the context of a conflict over Brexit between most N. Ireland voters and most British voters (including what must be a majority of the Tory party), N. Ireland needs representation from more than one anti-Brexit politician (the DUP are pro-Brexit and the independent Unionist is anti-Brexit). More generally and especially after the DUP used it’s MPs to prop up the Conservative government, the argument is also that N. Ireland needs anti-Tory representation to try and help stop more austerity and other Tory initiatives.

My friend in Dublin felt that abstention should be seen as a tactic and that SF could embarrass the DUP in the state-wide Parliament and reduce the strength of the Tory/DUP arrangement.

Initially I wrote the following:

“I’ve been thinking of SF and abstentionism. My opinion of Devlin-McAliskey is not hurt by the fact that she took her seat, but I’m inclined to go with what SF says about them taking their seats. I mean, clearly their voters seem just fine with that policy. I also wonder, what is behind that policy? Would they see it as recognizing British rule over the Six-Counties? is it that they have [outside the European Parliament] absolutely zero desire to vote on laws that effect the British people the way British politicians [in the Westminster Parliament] pass laws that govern Irish people [in the North]? Also, isn’t there a good chance it would result in another split in SF- not necessarily a tiny one?

I’m open-minded about what you’re saying, but so far I’m more inclined to just back whatever decision they make about it.”

(although I usually read a LOT about N. Ireland current events in the Irish News and the BBC News, I don’t have the money or time to also read more than a few things a month from republican sources of news and opinion and thus am not REAL familiar with the current thinking in SF)

(Bernadette Devlin-McAliskey is described here)

I’ll return to talk of abstention TODAY shortly.

After the 1981 Hunger-Strike which saw prisoner Bobby Sands elected to Westminster, SF started contesting elections in N. Ireland- I believe for the first time since the ’69/’70 split that saw the Provisionals created. This was a major step forward strategically for the Republican Movement (what back then would have been called the Provisional Republican Movement and what are called in more recent decades Sinn Fein and the IRA). I believe that during most of the years 1982-1997 the PRM was doing almost everything they could do to A) put pressure on the British and the Unionists, B) strengthen their movement, and C) help people. (although I wasn’t doing N. Ireland activism at the time, I would have supported the 1994-96 cease-fire by the IRA (the now permanent cease-fire started in 1997))

I’ll be briefly describing (and here and there evaluating) each part of this effort.

Armed Struggle

First, I did some research and some estimating and some math and concluded that only in .3% of their operations did the (P)IRA attempt to kill civilians. A post about that is here. Also, even though SF’s vote was only (on average) 40% of the Nationalist vote this is not the end of the story. There is plenty of evidence that almost the entire nationalist community supported the 1981 Hunger-Strikers (see the middle third of this). There is also evidence that almost no one in the Nationalist community went to the police about crime and instead almost everyone went to the IRA (this is supported by a statement by Eamonn McCann on pages 22-23 of the 1993 edition of his book “War and an Irish Town” and by an article around 2003 in the Irish Times). Most Nationalists who didn’t support the IRA’s campaign nonetheless agreed more or less with the IRA’s goals and wanted Volunteers (IRA members) around- for defense during times of sectarian tension and for when crime HAD to be dealt with violently.

Armed struggle was many things. It was a statement to the world that (independent of  how that statement was made) Republicans and Nationalists in general had serious problems with being ruled by Britain and with the inequality they experienced at the hands of the British and most of their Protestant neighbors. It was a refutation of Thatcher’s “Normalization” policy. The deaths of British soldiers, RUC officers and UDR (a locally recruited British Army unit) members made the news and underlined the occupation as such (and kind of suggested the possibility that if it weren’t for the British Army the IRA could defeat the local security forces and loyalist paramilitaries to such a degree that it would change the attitude of the Unionist population towards (and in) negotiations with their Nationalist neighbors and the Southern state). Those deaths were also aimed at sapping the will of the British to remain in N. Ireland. The bombing campaign in England had similar goals- sapping the will of the British, making the news and occasionally (in ways that RARELY resulted in civilian death) giving the British people some small sense of the terror their Army inflicted on the Nationalist population. Bombing of economic targets specifically in both England and the North was aimed at pressuring the business community into pressuring the British and the Unionists to change their attitude to negotiation with SF (bearing in mind what I write in the next paragraph (with parentheses), some IRA bombs in the North and in England were aimed largely at just disrupting life for people, to hopefully put more pressure on British and Unionist politicians). Armed struggle might have shown the security forces that they couldn’t  brutalize the Nationalist community with impunity.  Attacks on loyalist paramilitaries were relatively infrequent and probably rightly so- I think an argument has been made that they helped the British with their propaganda about being peace-keepers between two mutually hate-filled tribes.

(about 99% of the time that the IRA bombed civilian property the plan was to place the bomb, leave, phone in a warning, the place would be evacuated, and the bomb would go off. About 99% of the time that that was the plan that is what happened)

When I offered .3% as a relatively solid estimate for IRA operations where civilian life was targeted, I was not counting their efforts to help keep loyalist mobs outside Catholic areas and (towards the very beginning of the conflict) their efforts to help keep the security forces outside of some Catholic areas. The former saw them viewed as defenders of the Nationalist community. The latter made the “no-go” areas (especially Free Derry) possible for about two years. Including that stuff would lower it from .3% to something like .2%

As part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process after the first democratic election in South Africa, the ANC partly justified it’s use of force by saying that by attacking the infrastructure and security forces of the Apartheid state they were encouraging others to resist in other ways- that is, they showed that it was possible to strike at the state oppressing them.

Mass Struggle

Mass Struggle might be defined as the mobilization of large numbers of people for non-violent political conflict where their numbers (not arms or money or political power) are their weapons and public spaces are their battlefields- what we saw with the civil rights movements in both the US and N. Ireland. Marches and rallies around the prisoners issue (roughly 1978-1981) were organized (frequently by members or supporters of the Provisional Republican Movement). In terns of getting people in the street it was a massively successful effort, but when the prisoners struggle was over mass struggle appears to have decreased. The nationalist community broke back down into it’s constituent parts and marched separately or not at all. But SF still did organize marches and rallies and such and some WERE very large. Such actions demonstrate how DEEP a movement’s support is, and can result in helpful confrontations with the security forces, in a way more widely accepted than armed struggle.

Young People Rioting

I don’t know how many of those young people were members or supporters of the PRM but I think this is very relevant to putting pressure on the British. This was closer to being mass struggle than armed struggle was and could have been the result of mass struggle. But it also contained some plusses that were found more with armed struggle. It was probably more likely to get in the news than mass struggle, it could have resulted in serious injuries for the security forces (and often did) and even in the absence of an injury it could have sapped the will of the non-local part of the British Army, who were reminded more deeply than usual that they were unwanted in certain areas. But as it was less lethal than armed struggle and less likely (probably a LOT less likely) to result in civilian deaths caused by nationalists and republicans, it was more acceptable than armed struggle to many people.

Elections

Although I feel safe assuming that the PIRA campaign had the support of about 40% of the nationalist community in the 1970s, it is helpful to be able to point to votes for SF as proof that almost half that community DID support the PIRA’s armed campaign in the years 1982-1997. I believe in both “parliamentary” and “non-parliamentary” methods for creating political change but I, and a LOT of people attach a lot of value to how much popular support underground armies have. Election campaigns also give another chance to interact with voters and with the media and explain a party’s platform. Elected politicians, even those who don’t take their seats, might get more respect and/or a larger audience of (for example) potential converts and and might get more assistance of one sort or another from other politicians or activists, etc. (although less relevant, elections were also contested in the South)

Local Government Battles

SF not only contested local government elections, when elected they took their seats. This resulted in two different kinds of important battles engaged in by SF councilors and activists. First, to gain equality within the council- MANY SF councilors were blocked from access to the chamber, and/or to funding they and their areas were entitled to. Second, battles over issues relevant to local government. For example, around 1990 (according to the 1993 edition of McCann’s “War and an Irish Town” (p. 43)) a SF councilor in Derry led a successful campaign against the building of a toxic waste incinerator outside the city. Lastly, in general I think that sitting on local government councils proved that they were willing to try non-violent democratic engagement with their Unionist political opponents.

Propaganda

Propaganda is often defined neutrally and just means putting out a party’s message. SF did one newspaper during this time. One thing that might be sort of unusual in such situations was the HUGE number of murals in areas that were at least heavily if not mostly republican. Murals about the IRA, murals about international struggle, murals comparing the experience of nationalists to the experiences of people of color elsewhere, murals about community issues like poverty or eating disorders, murals about other topics. (I am almost certain that at least 90% of those murals were commissioned by SF, SF members or SF supporters)


International Solidarity

SF has done a fairly good job of generating international solidarity with them and with the nationalist community in some countries outside Ireland and Great Britain. But as I have explained elsewhere on this blog, in my opinion they are handicapping this work by making their approach in America much more moderate than progressive. (although significantly different, semi-successful efforts were made to mobilize supporters in Britain)

There is one tool that was used against Apartheid and that is being used against Israel that they have not pushed and that is boycott of, divestment from, and sanctions against the UK (not UN sanctions of course because of the veto the UK has in the Security Council). SF might have been silent about BDS because they knew that they didn’t have enough support globally to make it work. I go into that in a post here, starting with the paragraph that begins with “Was S. Africa much worse?”


One reason I have done this post is to say that members and supporters of the Republican Movement (and others in the Nationalist community in the North, but I have focused on SF because I support them) have done almost everything they could do to get the British out. Which makes it even more infuriating when I think of how little was done by the Left in western Europe and by the Left in America.


Abstention Today

Going back to abstention in Westminster today, exchanging some emails about it with my Dublin friend got me thinking more about SF taking their seats. I wonder if Westminster could be/should be seen by SF as just another battlefield on which to push the peace process, equality and even Irish Unity. In general it could be a forum to raise those issues. Also, it could help build a broad-based movement of British people supporting the Nationalist community if SF were to consistently vote progressively on things affecting British people like austerity, the environment, etc. (there’s a small mystery for me- the Troops Out Movement, which had good relations with SF, seems to have evaporated??????)

I should say that I believe that what we are talking about here are tactics and strategy but not principles (I have supported the 1997 IRA cease-fire since day one). I believe that the PRM usually did a great job of using them during the conflict and has usually been doing a great job using most of them since the conflict died down and basically ended (I would say around 2005) (with the exception of armed struggle and rioting the others are still being used by members and supporters of SF).

IF SF decide to take their seats, I would not criticize them about that (possibly about some of their votes, but with the exception of abortion I doubt even that would happen).